calculated after taxes and government transfers, incorporates all sources of household income, adjusts for household size, and includes children and the elderly. By contrast, earnings inequality involves individual full-time workers before taxes and transfers. While there are advantages to studying income inequality, earnings inequality may provide a more direct assessment of the economic standing of workers (Lindert and Williamson, 2003: 260) .
This neglect by sociologists is salient partly because sociologists might be able to offer a distinctive perspective for why earnings inequality has exhibited such historical variation. In particular, one core concern of economic sociology involves scrutinizing the macro-structural context in which individual work is embedded. At least one theme in economic sociology emphasizes how emergent structural changes, greater than and beyond individuals, influence economic inequality. Again, although studies of income inequality provide guidance, many structural changes might appear less relevant if one exclusively examines income inequality.
Taxes and transfers compensate for and alleviate how workers are affected by structural change. Therefore, to fully understand the distributional consequences of structural change for workers, it is essential to scrutinize the more proximate outcome of earnings inequality.
One structural change that may influence earnings inequality has been the increasing economic globalization of affluent democracies (DiPrete, 2005: 135; Morris and Western, 1999: 650) . Since the 1960s, international trade and investment have grown substantially across the affluent democracies. Figure 1 displays the trends since 1975 in "trade plus investment openness" (exports + imports + portfolio and direct [outward and inward] investment as a data for many countries on employment and hours worked. In addition, this paper's data advantageously has more than three times as many cases as the LIS. percent of GDP) for 18 affluent democracies (IMF, 2006 [ TAKE IN FIGURE 1 ] Globalization is often mentioned popularly as a cause of rising earnings inequality. Yet, scholars have been far more skeptical. Despite the increase in international trade and investment, most research doubts that globalization was a major source of earnings inequality (Bhagwati and Kosters, 1994; Gordon, 1994) . In the 1990s, many tested the impact of, for example, rising trade on earnings inequality in the U.S. and most concluded that globalization was a trivial influence (Burtless, 1995; Collins 1998; Richardson, 1995) . For example, Smeeding (2002: 179) writes, "Trade policy has not been shown to have any major impact on economic inequality." Some emphasized that the level of globalization, especially for the U.S., was too low to have a major effect on rising inequality. Also, globalization mainly involved exchange between affluent democracies, so the impact from developing countries like Mexico or China was actually quite limited (Gilpin, 2001 ). In a cross-national comparison, this skepticism appears warranted. As Figure 1 shows, Western Europe has been far more globalized and still has maintained far lower 2 Since portfolio and direct investment data is not available for most countries before 1975, this figure begins there. In all analyses below, I use the maximum available number of data points, including observations before 1975 for trade openness. The mean in figure 1 has a slightly different N at different time points because of missing investment data -this does not influence the pattern (Brady et al., 2007) .
earnings inequality. Thus, the cross-national patterns suggest that there is no relationship between globalization and earnings inequality. In short, the conventional wisdom has been quite skeptical of the effect of globalization on earnings inequality (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997) .
Rather than entering the globalization debate, an entirely different consensus has emerged around institutional explanations. Recent research convincingly demonstrates that most of the cross-national variation in earnings inequality is due to differences in labor market institutions (Western and Healy, 1999) . There is debate over whether it is unionization and parties (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000) , bargaining centralization (Wallerstein, 1999) , or other institutions that matter most (Blau and Kahn, 2002) . Nevertheless, the consensus focuses on cross-national variation in earnings inequality and concludes that institutions account for these differences (Morris and Western, 1999) . As DiPrete (2005: 123) remarks: "No one seriously denies that institutional forces are the proximate cause of these cross-national differences."
This paper takes these two literatures as a point of departure. First, building on evidence from sociology and elsewhere, I offer a theoretical account for why globalization may contribute to greater earnings inequality. Second, this study brings more comprehensive data on globalization and earnings inequality to revisit the skeptical globalization studies above. Third, instead of reassessing the clearly significant influence of institutions on cross-national variation, the analyses control for cross-national differences and scrutinize the historical variation. Using fixed-effects (FE) models, this study concentrates on the historical, within-country variation in earnings inequality. Specifically, I assess if increasing immigration, trade and international investment triggered greater earnings inequality over recent decades. Moreover, I examine if these effects are solely due to displacement as manifested in manufacturing employment and unemployment; or how much these effects result from power relations and institutional change. (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Brady et al., 2005; Brady et al., 2007; Lee, 2005) , and focus on globalization in recent decades in affluent democracies. Moreover, I concentrate on economic globalization as this is the most theoretically plausible component for earnings inequality.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Economic Globalization
Henceforth, I use the term "globalization" for brevity. I conceptualize globalization as international economic exchange and the flow of goods, services, labor, and capital. Following recent sociology, I operationalize it as international trade and investment and immigration.
Displacement Effects
In the 1980s, Harrison and Bluestone (1988) were among the first to call attention to the "Great U-Turn" of increasing inequality. They stressed that the long-term decline of inequality had halted and that deindustrialization, politics and a "globalization gambit" were "zapping labor" and triggering a surge in inequality. Most subsequent studies, including skeptical ones cited above, concentrated on estimating what can be called displacement effects. The argument was that rising immigration, trade and foreign investment displace workers in affluent countries.
Much of this displacement manifests through deindustrialization and unemployment as manufacturing and low-skill well-paid jobs decline in affluent democracies. Globalization reportedly reduces manufacturing employment and increases unemployment, and thus indirectly leads to earnings inequality.
Purportedly, more expensive domestic workers are displaced by cheaper foreign labor.
Rising immigration enlarges the supply of low paid workers, which swells the bottom of the distribution and undermines those in the middle (Borjas, 2001; Reed, 2001) . If a foreign company purchases a controlling interest in a domestic firm, lower wages result as jobs are eliminated to reduce redundancies within the multinational corporation. Budros (1997) finds that foreign consolidations, unlike domestic ones, significantly increase the adoption of downsizing programs -which are often used to dismiss well-paid workers (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005) .
As well, when foreign imports are substituted for domestic production, well-paid jobs are eroded and workers tend to be pushed downwards into lower-paying and less stable employment (Wood, 1994; Sachs and Shatz, 1998) . When cheaper foreign production competes with and is substituted for domestic workers, earnings inequality should increase (Harrison et al., 2007; Wood, 1995) . For example, Bonacich and Appelbaum (2000) show that sweatshops reemerged in the U.S. apparel industry partly because of the rise in offshore production and the related increase in cheap imports.
As mentioned above, much research has been skeptical of such displacement effects.
Most of this research used data that ended in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997) . Importantly, however, the heightened globalization in the later 1990s suggests the need to reconsider the matter. 3 As Figure 1 displayed, globalization increased substantially over the 1990s and only stabilized after 2000. Indeed, some recent research -often incorporating up-to-date data -has been more supportive of claims that globalization may have contributed to earnings inequality (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Bardhan and Howe, 2001; Feenstra, 2000) . For example, Dasgupta and Osang (2002) and Brady and Wallace (2000) show that international trade and investment have undermined worker earnings. As discussed above, cross-national analyses still demonstrate that globalization probably cannot explain differences between affluent democracies (Mahler, 2004 ). Yet, globalization may have contributed to increases in inequality within affluent democracies, especially after controlling for the stable differences between countries. Thus, the post-1990 rise in globalization suggests a need to revisit earlier skeptical studies.
In addition to reconsidering displacement effects, it would be worthwhile to explore if globalization has effects on earnings inequality because of processes beyond displacement.
Several sociologists claim globalization has spillover effects that extend beyond the confined band of workers who are affected directly when production is shifted overseas or when a domestic firm becomes foreign-affiliated (Brady and Wallace, 2000; Perucci, 1994) . While economists often focus on decomposing factor prices and accounting for how many domestic workers actually compete with workers in other countries (e.g. Collins, 1998) , it is equally important to consider the more sociological question of how increasing globalization has broader effects on the entire workforce (Piore, 1998) .
Beyond Displacement
There are at least two further reasons why globalization may be associated with greater earnings inequality. First, globalization alters the power relations between employers and employees, shifting power to managers and capital and undermining the class capacity of workers (Sklair, 2002) . Because power relations influence earnings inequality, increased globalization may result in greater earnings inequality. As Choi (2006: 78) remarks, "Firms' enhanced locational mobility as a result of the globalization process is effective in pressuring workers who fear losing their jobs to concede at the bargaining table and accept a lower share of the rent." Globalization undermines the position of labor, and magnifies the power of employers by searching for or threatening to search for cheaper and more pliable labor elsewhere (Brady and Wallace, 2000; Grant and Wallace, 1994) . As Freeman (1995: 21) summarizes, "If the West can import children's toys produced by low-paid Chinese workers at bargain basement prices, surely low-skilled westerners, who produce those toys at wages 10 times those of the Chinese, will face a difficult time in the job market. It isn't even necessary that the West import the toys.
The threat to import them or to move plants to less-developed countries to produce the toys may suffice to force low-skilled westerners to take a cut in pay to maintain employment."
Globalization empowers the managerial bureaucracies of multinational corporations to strengthen their control over labor while decentralizing production, a phenomenon Harrison (1994) refers to as "concentration without centralization."
Much research, linked to the deindustrialization literature, has debated whether globalization undermines labor's power. On balance, globalization cannot account for crossnational differences in labor institutions (Ebbinghaus, 2002) and is not entirely responsible for the decline of U.S. unions. But, there is considerable evidence that the over-time rise of trade and international investment weakens organized labor (Baldwin, 2003; Lee, 2005; Nissen, 2002; Slaughter, 2007) . Employers often globalize production to avoid high labor costs, less flexible work arrangements and explicitly to counter unionization. Western (1997) (Brady and Wallace, 2000) . Moreover, these threats have greater credibility and weight in an environment of heightened globalization (Choi, 2006) .
Second, globalization may produce institutional change that results in greater earnings inequality. "Institutional change" is a broad term for a diverse set of organizational practices, managerial strategies, and firm behaviors, and the altered social contracts between workers, managers and employers (e.g. Ono 2007 ). Whereas power relations involves the explicit and implicit negotiation and struggles between workers and managers and employers, institutional change focuses more on the often uncontested drift of procedure and practice. Globalization contextually changes the nature of work and the organizational practices of firms (Guler et al., 2002; Sklair, 2001) , contributing to what Harrison (1994) calls the "dark side of flexible production." Globalization-triggered institutional changes create greater volatility, uncertainty and insecurity for workers, undermine the stability of management-labor relations, and ultimately may result in greater earnings inequality (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Anderson et al., 2001; Piore, 1998) . These claims are supported by recent research on how globalization shapes workers' experiences, especially within multi-national firms (Gille and O Riain, 2002) .
For example, Scheve and Slaughter (2004) find that foreign direct investment increased employee perceptions of insecurity in Britain in the 1990s. Kurdelbusch (2002) demonstrates that large companies in Germany increasingly implement variable pay schemes as a result of the growing internationalization of product and capital markets. Graham (1995) documents the hegemonic, exploitative and anti-union managerial practices that exist under the rhetorically "team"-based flexible work arrangements of a Japanese automotive plant in the U.S.
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These globalization-triggered institutional changes towards greater uncertainty, instability and insecurity may cultivate wage polarization, often in the name of global competitiveness (Sklair, 2001) . Sassen (1991) argues that globalization polarizes the earnings and occupational distribution: increasing contingent workers in clerical, service and goods-producing firms;
eroding job security, compensation and social wages; and simultaneously enhancing the position of elites. With heightened globalization, firms often loosen commitments to and social contracts with less skilled and increasingly disposable employees (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005; Graham, 1995) . At the same time, global corporations often endorse escalating compensation for highly skilled workers in the larger competitive field of the global economy. In contrast to domestic firms in Japan, Ono (2007) shows that foreign firms are likely to undermine earnings at the bottom (less trust between employers and workers, less job security, short-term contracts, greater quit rates, lower returns to firm-specific human capital, less effort-driven compensation)
and enhance earnings at the top (greater returns to general human capital, higher average earnings, poaching mid-career employees from other firms, selection of high mobility/ability employees, more performance-driven compensation, and individualistic cultures). Ultimately, such globalized institutional changes are less conducive to demands for rising median wages and equalization of compensation (Harrison, 1994) .
The present analyses assess: a) if increasing globalization triggers earnings inequality and, b) if globalization's effects are at least partly due to processes beyond displacement. If globalization's effects are solely due to displacement, the effects would initially be significant when manufacturing employment and unemployment are omitted from the model. However, globalization's effects would become insignificant after adding those controls. If globalization contributes to earnings inequality because of processes of power relations and institutional change, globalization would remain significant even when those two variables are added.
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METHODS
Sample and Technique
The analysis includes 18 affluent democracies (see Table 2 ). The unit of analysis is the country-year, and the OECD earnings inequality database has 333 country-years. While each country has data on earnings inequality for several years, the exact years varies by country (see Table 2 ). Because of unmeasured time-invariant heteroscedasticity across countries and serial correlation between years (Hsiao, 2003) , I estimate fixed effects models with a first-order autocorrelation correction (FE-AR1). FE-AR1 models controls for unobserved unit effects with country-dummies and by differencing every country-year from the country mean. The FE model can be represented as:
Y it = α i C i + βX it + ε it , which is then estimated by:
The subscript i represents a country and t represents a year. Y represents earnings inequality, C is a vector of country-dummies (which drop out in the second model), and X represents a vector of independent variables. Since the FE model differences each observation from its countrymean (i.e. X i ), all cross-national differences are removed. As well, the error is corrected for temporal autocorrelation (AR1). Because FE-AR1 models incorporate the error term from the first time-point in the autocorrelation correction, the maximum number of observations drops from 333 to 315. 6 The FE-AR1 technique can effectively accommodate gaps in the time series and unevenly balanced panels (Baltagi and Wu, 1999) . Advantageously, FE models may be a more stringent test of causality (Winship and Morgan, 1999) . In addition to country fixed effects, the models include dummy variables for each decade (reference = 2000's).
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Because my question regards within-country historical variation, FE-AR1 models are more appropriate than random effects (RE) models. Also, available tests prefer FE models over RE models. 8 Another alternative would be difference models. However, difference models would change the question to short-term change rather than long-term change (as FE-AR1 models difference each country-year from country-means not the preceding country-year).
Difference models also are inappropriate because the sample is unbalanced with uneven spacing. 
Dependent Variables
The estimates of earnings inequality are from the "OECD Earnings Inequality Database" (see Rueda and Pontusson, 2000) . These estimates are based on full-time employed workers. 
Globalization Variables
Four concerns guide the operationalization of globalization (cf. Brady et al., 2005) . First, I concentrate on the actual flows of finance, goods and services across national boundaries.
Hence, I only examine actual economic exchange and am not testing the political/legal possibility of exchange. Second, I focus on the largest dimensions of international economic exchange and do not limit the analysis to exchange with developing countries. 10 Third, the globalization variables are not normally distributed, exhibit significant skew and have several outliers. As a remedy, I transform the globalization measures into the natural logarithm (but not the dependent and control variables as they do not suffer from these problems), which rectifies the problem. Fourth, I aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the multiple facets of globalization while presenting only a parsimonious set of summary measures. In the appendix, I
test each component of these summary measures as well as several alternatives. The results are robust, although some components were not as significant as the summary measures.
Concretely, I present measures of immigration, and international investment and trade. (IMF, 2000) . 11 The OECD has data on the percent of the population foreign born, but unfortunately these data are not available before the mid-1980s, and are spotty for most nations. 12 Portfolio includes bond/equity investment that amount to less than a 10% ownership share, while direct investment represents capital flows involving at least a 10% ownership share and management of a firm. Since I add these measures into one summary measure of investment openness, the distinction is only relevant in the Appendix. 13 Since the variables are in natural logarithm, negative values (e.g. out-migration) are dropped as they are undefined. Values less than 1.0 become negative. This explains the difference in N between investment openness and trade plus investment openness in the Appendix.
Control Variables
The models control for several variables identified as key predictors of earnings inequality (Morris and Western, 1999; Neckerman and Torche, 2007; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Wallerstein, 1999) . Each control is lagged one year. In order to assess globalization's effects before controlling for displacement, I first include a set of controls in all models.
Productivity is the ratio of real gross domestic product (GDP) per employee, divided by 1000 for ease of presentation. 14 Agricultural Employment is measured as a percent of the labor force. Of course, the FE-AR1 strategy has limitations for assessing these controls. All crossnational variation "drops out," so the variables can only explain historical variation. Since several controls mostly vary across countries and are relatively stable over time, the FE-AR1 models provide a lower-bound estimate of their effects. But, given my objectives, this should be a lesser concern. In addition to these controls, I considered controls for education and 14 Although one could add productivity-squared to reflect the Kuznets curve (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002) , there was inconclusive evidence that it was worth the loss of parsimony. The globalization results are robust if productivity-squared is added. 15 In other analyses, I substituted female labor force participation. The results were consistent except the female employment rate had a more robust significant effect. 16 This measure sums "right" parties, "right, Christian" parties, and "right, Catholic" parties.
unionization. Unfortunately, because of data availability and measurement limitations, I
ultimately cannot include these two. Nevertheless, I analyzed models with these controls to be sure the results were robust and, indeed, this was the case for the globalization effects.
To test the effect of globalization on earnings inequality, I first display models of the three dependent variables including only the controls. Second, I display the effects of each globalization measure while omitting manufacturing employment and unemployment. Third, I
add these two indicators of displacement. Fourth, I repeat steps 2 and 3 with all three globalization measures in one model. Finally, I decompose the analyses by period and region.
Throughout, I use two-tailed tests of significance. In addition to coefficient size and significance, I compare models with the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Table 2 displays the 90/10, 90/50 and 50/10 earnings inequality ratios across the 18 affluent democracies. The 90/10 ratio increased in 13 of 18 countries. The 90/50 ratio increased in 16 of 18 countries, while the 50/10 ratio actually declined in 10 of 18 countries. The U.S.
RESULTS
experienced the largest increase in the 90/10 ratio (27.6%) and 90/50 ratio (19.2%), while
Switzerland experienced the largest increase in the 50/10 ratio (12.9%). As mentioned above, several countries experienced a greater than ten percent increase in at least one ratio, while a few experienced declines. Interestingly, eight countries experienced rising earnings inequality with one measure and a decline with another.
[ TAKE IN ratio. This is somewhat surprising as unemployment is purported to siphon off the bottom of the distribution of employees, and because many attribute Europe's lower inequality to rigid labor market institutions that cause higher unemployment (cf. Blau and Kahn, 2002; DiPrete, 2005) .
By contrast, in FE models focused on over-time variation, unemployment appears to drive up inequality.
[ TAKE IN TABLE 3 ] The three remaining variables approximate the influence of national-level political and labor market institutions. Again, one should cautiously interpret these coefficients because FE models remove all cross-national variation. Surprisingly, public employment does not significantly influence the 90/10 and 50/10 ratio and actually is positively associated with the 90/50 ratio. Also, wage coordination does not significantly affect any of the three dependent variables. So, these two do not appear to reduce temporal variation in earnings inequality after removing cross-national differences. By contrast, cumulative right party power has a modest, positive significant effect on the 90/10 and 90/50 ratio. For each year right parties have controlled the government since 1946, the 90/10 ratio is expected to increase by about .04 standard deviations and the 90/50 ratio is expected to rise by about .07 standard deviations. Models 5 and 6 show that investment openness significantly affects the 90/10 ratio before and after controlling for manufacturing and unemployment. For a standard deviation increase in investment openness, the 90/10 ratio should increase by about .04 standard deviations. The size and significance of this coefficient very slightly attenuates from models 5 to 6, which suggests that a small part of investment openness' effect is due to displacement. Although investment openness has a significant effect, the magnitude of its effect is much smaller than the effects of trade openness in models 3-4.
Thus, the initial models suggest that two of the globalization measures are significantly associated with greater earnings inequality. In models 7 and 8, I scrutinize the influence of these globalization measures further by modeling all three globalization measures together.
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Plausibly, these models provide a more rigorous test of each globalization measure's impact net 17 Collinearity is not a problem in the combined models. The correlation between net migration and trade openness is merely -.01, and .11 with investment openness. Trade openness and investment openness correlate much higher, but still at a manageable .55. The Variance Inflation Factors for net migration (1.03), trade openness (1.05) and investment openness (2.10) are far below problematic levels.
of the other dimensions. Both models demonstrate that trade openness continues to have a significant positive effect, while net migration continues to be and investment openness becomes insignificant. Trade openness emerges as the globalization indicator that is most consequential to the 90/10 ratio. In models 7 and 8, trade openness actually has a larger effect than in models 3-4. For a standard deviation increase in trade openness, the 90/10 ratio is expected to increase by about .25-.22 standard deviations. The size and significance of this effect is moderately weaker after controlling for manufacturing and unemployment. Thus, part of trade openness' effect on the 90/10 ratio can be explained by displacement. Nevertheless, trade openness also has a direct effect, net of displacement.
18 Table 5 analyzes the 90/50 ratio and Table 6 analyzes the 50/10 ratio. For brevity purposes, I concisely summarize the results here. In general, the results are very similar to the 90/10 ratio results. Net migration never has a significant effect for the 90/50 ratio, but is significantly positive in the initial 50/10 ratio models. However, net migration is not significant in the final models. Consistent with the 90/10 ratio, investment openness has a significant effect in models 5-6 for both tables, but is not significant in the final models. Trade openness has a significant positive effect throughout: before and after controlling for displacement and in initial and final models. With a standard deviation increase in trade openness, the 90/50 ratio should increase by about .41-.57 standard deviations. With a standard deviation increase in trade openness, the 50/10 ratio is expected to increase by about .22-.35 standard deviations.
[ TAKE IN TABLES 5 AND 6 ] 18 All conclusions for the globalization variables are robust if all controls (except or including the decade dummies) are dropped. For example, if model 7/8 is reestimated with no controls but with decade dummies, trade openness is even more significantly positive (t>17). Net migration and investment openness would still not be significant (though investment openness would be significant in model 5/6 with no controls).
In sum, trade openness is the only globalization measure that has a robust significant effect on earnings inequality. Moreover, trade openness always has a much larger effect than net migration and investment openness, even when those variables are significant. The BIC statistic provides further evidence that trade openness is the component of globalization that is most salient to earnings inequality. Since the number of cases differs across models, one should be cautious with these comparisons. Nevertheless, models 3-4 featuring trade openness are the only models in Table 4 -6 that are preferred by BIC over the controls models in Table 3 . BIC prefers model 4 over the control models "positively" for the 90/10 ratio and "very strongly" for the 90/50 ratio and 50/10 ratio (Raftery, 1995) . to acknowledge that other factors (see Table 3 ) have contributed more to the rise of earnings inequality than globalization.
In addition to the full sample, I examined the relationship between trade openness and earnings inequality in sub-samples. There are two plausible reasons for decomposition. First, I
argued that we should revisit skeptical studies since globalization rose significantly in the late 1990s. One way to test if my significant results are partly due to this would be to compare the results with the earlier period that was documented by skeptical studies. Second, it could be that much of what we observe as globalization is solely due to the heightened trade within the European Union (Beckfield, 2006) . Although globalization and regionalization are complementary parts of a common process (Kim and Shin, 2002) , it would be valuable to explore the effect of trade openness inside and outside the European Union. Confirming earlier skeptical studies, trade openness does not have a significant effect for two of the three dependent variables. Even its effect for the 90/50 ratio is only significant at the .10 level. Thus, one of the reasons the earlier skeptical studies concluded that globalization was inconsequential to earnings inequality is because of the use of a time period prior to globalization's expansion in the 1990s. A variety of other sensitivity analyses were also considered (also see footnotes). I estimated all models with one country omitted at a time, and the conclusions were consistent.
Also, I tested whether the effect of globalization varied over time by interacting the globalization variables with various measures of time. None of the interaction effects were significant.
Finally, as mentioned above, I reestimated the models including union density and/or education.
All of the conclusions about the globalization effects were consistent in these analyses as well. if trade openness had not risen as far and fast as it did, but increased trade worsened an already polarized earnings distribution.
CONCLUSION
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Though others have provided evidence to suggest a link between globalization and various dimensions of inequality, the present study offers a few novel contributions. One is that the analyses incorporate up-to-date data on globalization and earnings inequality. In the mid1990s, many used data through the late 1980s or early 1990s to conclude skeptically that globalization had very little influence. By contrast, this study includes the heightening of globalization that occurred after 1990. Another is that this study includes a comprehensive set of globalization measures to assess its multiple potential impacts. Yet another is the analysis of a valuable database and a dependent variable -earnings inequality -that have been relatively neglected by sociologists. Earnings inequality provides a more direct measure of and more proximately gauges how globalization affects workers. Hence, this study contributes a unique assessment of globalization's distributional consequences in affluent democracies.
A key concern of previous studies has been displacement effects. Because a portion of the effects of trade openness can be explained by manufacturing employment and unemployment, increasing trade may displace workers when foreign production is substituted for relatively well-paid domestic workers. However, this study is ultimately skeptical of immigration as a major influence on earnings inequality. At least in the U.S., immigration has probably garnered the most attention as a displacement effect on earnings inequality (e.g. Borjas, 2001) . 22 Beyond displacement, the analyses also explore how globalization has spillover effects beyond those directly impacted by globalization. Rather than constraining sociological inquiry on the consequences of globalization to displacement, this study encourages the consideration of the deeply sociological concerns of power relations and institutional change. Indeed, this study provides some evidence that the effects of trade openness are not exclusively due to displacement. The effects of trade openness remain significantly positive, even after controlling for two indicators of displacement. Thus, trade openness may contribute to additional pathways by which globalization results in increased earnings inequality. As discussed earlier, previous scholarship suggests that globalization alters the power relations between employers and employees, and contributes to institutional change in the nature of work and the organizational practices of business.
Partly to address this study's limitations, I encourage future research in several directions.
Although my findings demonstrate robust significant effects solely for trade openness, one can certainly envision how investment openness could contribute to similar processes of power relations and institutional change (Brady and Wallace 2000) . Given the theoretical plausibility of such a relationship, it would be worthwhile to examine the effects of foreign investment further (e.g. the significant effects of outward portfolio investment in the Appendix). Subsequent studies should attempt to sort out the relative influence for the three plausible mediating processes: displacement, power relations and institutional change. My findings confirm others' arguments, and supplement the evidentiary base, but cannot adjudicate between these two 22 Of course, there is a possibility that a different measure of immigration -for example, the percent foreign born (see fn. 11) -might result in more significant effects. However, net migration is a measure of "flows" just like the trade and investment openness measures. Switching to measures of globalization "stock" (i.e. the percent foreign born) might result in larger effects for trade and investment as well.
processes. Also, studies should explore the possibility that globalization's effects vary across countries with more or less prominent labor market institutions.
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Finally, and most importantly, research is needed to make explicit the mechanisms by which trade triggers greater inequality. By demonstrating the robustness of the general relationship between trade and inequality at the country-level, this macro-level study can serve as a complement to the vibrant ethnographic literature on how globalization influences workers at the micro-level (e.g. Graham, 1995; Gille and O Riain, 2002) . Nevertheless, future research will probably need to move beyond macro-level analyses to open up the black box of causality in the relationship between trade and inequality. Future studies should combine longitudinal microlevel studies of firms and meso-level studies of industries experiencing globalization. Plausibly such studies will be able to trace the causal processes involved when firms/industries experience heightened trade (both via suppliers and competitors). To fully understand precisely how and if power relations and institutional change act as mechanisms contributing to greater earnings inequality, scholars will need to construct narratives of firm and industry change. Most likely, such integration between micro-, meso-and macro-level studies of globalization will result in improved sociological insight into the causal processes and mechanisms generating inequalities.
Therefore, ultimately, more research is needed to discern what and how precise mechanisms explain the relationship between trade openness and earnings inequality.
Since Harrison and Bluestone (1988) provoked interest in the Great U-Turn, much research has been skeptical about whether globalization truly mattered to inequality among workers. This study provides novel evidence that at least one dimension of globalization, trade openness, is consequential for rising earnings inequality in affluent democracies. Whereas previous research has often focused on the possible displacement effects of increased globalization, this study encourages research on the spillover effects for the entire workforce in terms of power relations and institutional change. Finally, since globalization grew substantially over the 1990s, it is possible that globalization will continue to become an even more consequential structural change for workers. All models include a first order autocorrelation correction. All models include dummies for decades (reference=2000's). All controls are lagged one year. All globalization variables are lagged one year and converted to natural logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are t-scores. All models include a first order autocorrelation correction. All models include dummies for decades (reference=2000's). All controls are lagged one year. All globalization variables are lagged one year and converted to natural logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are t-scores. All models include a first order autocorrelation correction. All models include dummies for decades (reference=2000's). All controls are lagged one year. All globalization variables are lagged one year and converted to natural logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are t-scores. All models include a first order autocorrelation correction. All models include dummies for decades (reference=2000's). Though not shown, all models include the controls (lagged one year) from the second set of models in Tables 4-6. Trade openness is lagged one year and converted to natural logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are t-scores. Notes: All models include a first order autocorrelation correction. All models include the controls from Table 2 and dummies for decades (reference=2000's). All control variables are lagged one year. All globalization variables are as a % of GDP (except % of Imports from LDCs), lagged one year, and converted to natural logarithm. The numbers in parentheses are t-scores.
